Accountability through facts.
The Supreme Court
October Term 2026
The cases the Court has agreed to hear, when it hears them, and its decisions as they're released.
To be decided · 35
25-170 · from SC-Colo.
SUNCOR ENERGY (U.S.A.) INC. V. COMMISSIONERS OF BOULDER COUNTY
Argument: Oct 5, 2026 · Granted Feb 23, 2026
Question presented
Whether federal law precludes state-law claims seeking relief for injuries allegedly caused by the effects of interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions on the global climate.
IN ADDITION TO THE QUESTION PRESENTED BY THE PETITION, THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER THIS COURT HAS STATUTORY AND ARTICLE III JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS CASE. SEPTEMBER 28, 2026: JUSTICE ALITO WILL NOT CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS CASE.
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-735 · from USCA-11
JOHNSON V. UNITED STATES CONGRESS
Argument: Oct 5, 2026 · Granted Apr 6, 2026
Question presented
Did the Veterans' Judicial Review Act strip district courts of the jurisdiction, recognized by this Court in Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974), to hear challenges to the constitutionality of acts of Congress affecting veterans' benefits?
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-498 · from USCA-9
ANDERSON V. INTEL CORP. INVESTMENT POLICY COMM.
Argument: Oct 6, 2026 · Granted Jan 16, 2026
Question presented
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), a plan fiduciary is subject to a "[p]rudent man standard of care," which requires the fiduciary to "discharge his duties with respect to a plan" with the "care, skill, prudence, and diligence" that a prudent person "acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1)). As this Court has recognized, a court's inquiry into whether a plaintiff has adequately alleged that a fiduciary breached ERISA's duty of prudence "will necessarily be context specific" because the content of that duty "turns on 'the circumstances ... prevailing' at the time the fiduciary acts." Fifth Third Bancorp. v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 425 (2014) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)). As a result, "categorical" pleading rules are "inconsistent with the context-specific inquiry that ERISA requires." Hughes v. Nw. Univ., 595 U.S.170, 173 (2022).
The question presented is: Whether, for claims predicated on fund underperformance, pleading that an ERISA fiduciary failed to use the requisite "care, skill, prudence, or diligence" under the circumstances and thus breached ERISA's duty of prudence when investing plan assets requires alleging a "meaningful benchmark."
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-579 · from USCA-9
DEPARTMENT OF AIR FORCE V. PRUTEHI GUAHAN
Argument: Oct 7, 2026 · Granted Mar 9, 2026
Question presented
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq., is a comprehensive environmental statute providing for cradle-to-grave regulation of hazardous waste through a scheme of cooperative federalism. Under RCRA, the United States Environmental Protection Agency may authorize state and territorial regulators to administer permitting programs for hazardous-waste-treatment facilities in their respective jurisdictions, including facilities operated by the federal government. The questions presented are as follows:
1. Whether the federal government's submission to a state or territorial regulator of an application to renew a RCRA permit is "final agency action" that is immediately reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 704.
2. Whether the federal government must comply with the general environmentalreview procedures of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., before submitting a permit-renewal application under RCRA, which sets forth its own specific procedures to review environmental impacts in the context of hazardous-waste treatment.
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-5343 · from USCA-5
BEAIRD V. UNITED STATES
Argument: Oct 13, 2026 · Granted Apr 20, 2026
Question presented
I. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment? II. Whether Stinson v. United States still accurately state the level of deference due to the Commentary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines? III. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) permits conviction for the possession of any firearm that has ever crossed state lines at any time in the indefinite past, and, if so, if it is facially unconstitutional?
THE MOTION OF PETITIONER FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS IS GRANTED. THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER STINSON V. UNITED STATES, 508 U. S. 36 (1993), STILL CORRECTLY STATES THE RULE FOR THE DEFERENCE THAT COURTS MUST GIVE THE COMMENTARY TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES. Order of May 6, 2026 ANTHONY J. DICK, ESQUIRE, OF WASHINGTON, D. C., IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF THE POSITION THAT STINSON V. UNITED STATES, 508 U. S. 36 (1993), STILL CORRECTLY STATES THE RULE FOR THE DEFERENCE THAT COURTS MUST GIVE THE COMMENTARY TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES.
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-886 · from USCA-2 (No. 22-70 only)
GENALO V. BLACK
Argument: Oct 13, 2026 · Granted Jun 15, 2026
Question presented
Under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), certain criminal aliens are required to be detained pending a decision on whether they are to be removed from the United States. In Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), this Court held that Section 1226(c) prohibits the release of such aliens on bond. The Court reserved judgment on various constitutional issues on which it had ordered supplemental briefing, including whether the Due Process Clause requires bond hearings for certain Section 1226(c) detainees and, if so, what kind of bond hearing. Respondents here are two criminal aliens detained under Section 1226(c) for 7 and 21 months, respectively, pending their removal proceedings. The court of appeals held that each respondent's detention had become "unreasonably prolonged," such that due process entitled him to a bond hearing with the burden placed on the government to justify his continued detention by clear and convincing evidence. Pet. App. 5a. The questions presented are:
1. Whether there is a point at which an alien's detention under Section 1226(c), pending a decision on whether he is to be removed, becomes "unreasonably prolonged," such that due process requires a bond hearing. 2. If so, whether, in such a bond hearing, due process requires placing the burden on the government to justify the alien's continued detention by clear and convincing evidence.
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-459 · from USCA-6
SALAZAR V. PARAMOUNT GLOBAL
Argument: Oct 14, 2026 · Granted Jan 26, 2026
Question presented
The Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”) contains a one-sentence liability clause. It prohibits a “video tape service provider” from “knowingly disclos[ing], to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider.” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1). The statute defines “consumer” broadly to include a “subscriber of goods or services from a video tape service provider.” Id. § 2710(a)(1). It defines “personally identifiable information” to include information that “identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or services from a video tape service provider.” Id. § 2710(a)(3). And it defines “video tape service provider” to include those in the business of delivering audiovisual materials. Id. § 2710(a)(4). Paramount is a “video tape service provider.” Both courts below assumed as much. Michael Salazar subscribed to Paramount’s online newsletter, which he used to view videos. Paramount then disclosed Mr. Salazar’s Facebook ID and his video-watching history to Facebook. That information counts as “personally identifiable information.” Again, both courts below assumed as much. The question here is whether the phrase “goods or services from a video tape service provider,” as used in the VPPA’s definition of “consumer,” refers to all of a video tape service provider’s goods or services or only to its audiovisual goods or services.
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-352 · from USCA-11
YOUNGE V. FULTON JUDICIAL CIRCUIT DIST. ATT’Y
Argument: Nov 2, 2026 · Granted Mar 30, 2026
Question presented
Rule 8(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party "must" plead "any" affirmative defense. The question presented is: Where a defendant has filed an answer without pleading an affirmative defense, may the defendant nonetheless assert that affirmative defense as the basis for a summary judgment motion, without amending or seeking to amend its answer to plead that affirmative defense, and may a defendant do so even if an amendment adding that affirmative defense would be barred by Rule 16(b)(4)?
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-5930 · from USCA-5
MAXWELL V. DINIS
Argument: Nov 2, 2026 · Granted Jun 1, 2026
Question presented
In 2020 Maxwell sought transfer to halfway house or home confinement under the First Step Act of 2018, 18 U.S.C. §3624(g), 18 U.S.C. §3621(b) and §3621(h), the CARES Act of 2020, 18 U.S.C. §3624(c), the Second Chance Act of 2018 reauthorized by the First Step Act of 2018, 34 U.S.C. §60541, and Compassionate Release. The Warden only addressed Maxwell's CARES Act request and denied relief. The warden otherwise ignored all Maxwell's other explicitly pled issues. Maxwell, after exhausting his administrative remedies proceeded in Court, filing a §2241 habeas. The U.S.D.C. dismissed alleging Maxwell failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for First Step Act relief. Maxwell appealed the decision of the U.S.D.C. to the Fifth Circuit.
Sua sponte, the Fifth Circuit held, contrary to this Court’s decision in Jones v. Hendrix, 216 L.Ed.2d 471, 484 (2022), and contrary to nine other Courts of Appeal -- see Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2025); Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 2001); Hernandez v, Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hutchins, 835 F.2d 185, 186 (8th Cir, 1987); Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 865 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Little, 392 F.3d 671, 678- 79 (4th Cir. 2024); McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus. - Suncoast, 851 F.3d 1076, 1092-93 (11th Cir. 2007) (en banc); United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 50 n.10 (1st Cir. 1999); and Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1998) --that its bright-line rule adopted in Melot v. Bergomi, 970 F.3d 596, 599 (5th Cir. 2020) controlled. There the Fifth Circuit held that unless a favorable determination of the prisoner's claim would not automatically entitle him to accelerated release from his sentence, then the proper vehicle is a civil rights suit. The Fifth Circuit dismissed. I. The question for this Court is whether disputes regarding the calculation of an inmate's earned First Step Act time credits, enabling the inmate to transfer into halfway house or home confinement earlier, similar to parole, are actionable under 28 U.S.C. §2241, II. The question for this Court is whether, given all the obstruction of the administrative remedy process that took place in this case, under Perttu v. Richards, exhaustion of administrative remedies is interwoven into the underlying claims themselves, creating a fact issue for a jury, and whether the trial court must make that determination in the first instance
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-581 · from USCA-10
ST. MARY CATHOLIC PARISH V. ROY
Argument: Nov 3, 2026 · Granted Apr 20, 2026
Question presented
Colorado's so-called universal preschool program pays for families to send their children to the preschool of their choice, public or private. To participate, preschools must ensure all families have an "equal opportunity" to enroll regardless of, inter alia, race, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, gender identity, income level, or disability. Colorado nonetheless permits numerous exemptions from this requirement, both categorical and discretionary, allowing preschools to admit only "children of color," "gender-nonconforming children," "the LGBTQ community," low-income families, and children with disabilities. But Colorado excludes Catholic preschools because they admit only families who support Catholic beliefs, including on sex and gender.
The Tenth Circuit upheld Colorado's decision to exclude Catholic preschools. Applying Employment Division v. Smith, it held that Colorado's secular exemptions and discretion did not undermine general applicability. In so doing, the court sided with the minority position in an entrenched and acknowledged 7 -4 split over what kinds of exemptions and discretion undermine general applicability. The court also eschewed Carson v. Makin, concluding that its rule was inapplicable because Colorado's exclusion was not "on the explicit basis" of religion.
The questions presented are:
1. Whether proving a lack of general applicability under Employment Division v. Smith requires showing unfettered discretion or categorical exemptions for identical secular conduct.
2. Whether Carson v. Makin displaces the rule of Employment Division v. Smith only when the government explicitly excludes religious people and institutions.
3. Whether Employment Division v. Smith should be overruled
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-1003 · from USCA-5
GUERRERO V. JOHNSON
Argument: Nov 4, 2026 · Granted Jun 15, 2026
Question presented
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) prohibits successive habeas applications by state prisoners with only narrow exceptions, including for claims that "rel[y] on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). Near-identical language allows federal prisoners to file a successive habeas motion that contains "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." Id. § 2255(h)(2).
The courts of appeals are divided over whether claims rely on "a new rule ... that was previously unavailable" when a claim based on the rule could have been raised in an earlier federal habeas petition but would not have succeeded. The Eleventh and Fourth Circuits hold that whether a claim would have been meritorious does not affect whether the rule was previously available. In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit adhered to its view (and that of the Ninth Circuit) that a claim was previously available only if it had "some possibility of merit" based on the evidence available to the petitioner at the time of an earlier petition.
The question presented is: Whether a claim relies on a "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable" when the habeas petitioner could have asserted a claim based on the rule in a prior federal habeas petition.
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-159 · from USCA-8
HOFFMANN V. WBI ENERGY TRANSMISSION, INC.
Argument: Nov 9, 2026 · Granted Jun 29, 2026
Question presented
The Natural Gas Act authorizes private companies to condemn land in order to build certain natural gas infrastructure, but it says nothing about how to determine the amount of just compensation owed for the property taken. 15 U.S.C. § 717f. The Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have all held that compensation awards in private condemnations under the Natural Gas Act must therefore be determined by reference to state law, which often mandates higher compensation than the floor set by the Fifth Amendment. In this case, the Eighth Circuit expressly split with its sister circuits and instead held that the Natural Gas Act permits only the constitutional minimum of compensation required by the Fifth Amendment. The question presented is:
In private condemnations under the Natural Gas Act, should just compensation be determined by reference to state law?
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-417 · from USCA-9
NIELSEN V. WATANABE
Argument: Nov 9, 2026 · Granted Jun 22, 2026
Question presented
This case concerns the judicially created damages remedy first recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), the Court extended Bivens to an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs where prison officials failed to address an inmate's acute asthma attack and exacerbated it, causing his death on-site within hours.
Since then, this Court has emphasized that the creation of damages actions rests with Congress, not courts. The judicially created Bivens remedy thus cannot be ex-tended to any "new Bivens context" if any "special factor counsel[s] hesitation" in doing so. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 139-140 (2017). "[T]he new-context inquiry is easily satisfied," encompassing cases with '"meaningful[ly]"' different facts, or "'potential special factors' "-including "alternative remedial structures"-" 'not consider[ed]"' in the Court's prior cases. Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 492-493 (2022). "[A] court may not recognize a Bivens remedy" if "there is any reason to think that Congress might be better equipped to create a damages remedy." Id. at 492.
In this case, respondent alleged that he suffered a fractured coccyx in a prison gang fight, causing chronic pain, but was not sent to a hospital. The Ninth Circuit held the suit did not present a "new" context from Carlson-not-withstanding an alternative remedial scheme this Court did not consider in Carlson, and despite significant factual differences such as the immediacy and severity of the harm alleged. The question presented is:
Whether the Ninth Circuit here erred in recognizing a Bivens cause of action.
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-966 · from USCA-3
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR V. SUN VALLEY ORCHARDS, LLC
Argument: Nov 10, 2026 · Granted Apr 27, 2026
Question presented
The H-2A visa program grants U.S. employers the privilege of "import[ing]" foreign aliens into the United States for temporary agricultural work under special visas. 8 U.S.C. 1188(a)(1). As a condition of granting petitions to import foreign workers, federal law requires an employer to agree to comply with statutory and regulatory requirements governing workers' living and working conditions. Congress has authorized the Secretary of Labor to impose monetary remedies to assure employer compliance with those "terms and conditions." 8 U.S.C. 1188(g)(2). The question presented is:
Whether Article III of the Constitution precludes Congress from assigning to the Secretary of Labor the initial adjudication of proceedings to collect monetary remedies from employers who violate the terms and conditions of participating in the H-2A visa program.
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-183 · from USCA-11
CROWTHER V. BD. OF REGENTS UNIV. SYSTEM OF GA
Argument: Nov 30, 2026 · Granted May 18, 2026
Question presented
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits federally funded educational institutions from discriminating "on the basis of sex." In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), this Court held that Title IX is privately enforceable by "victims of discrimination" through an implied right of action. And in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005), this Court held that employees of federally funded educational institutions may invoke Title IX's implied private right of action to bring claims for retaliation.
Following Jackson, and until the decision below, "every ... circuit[] that has considered whether a teacher may sue under Title IX" for sex discrimination in their employment "has found they may." Pet App. 124a (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Splitting with eight courts of appeals, the Eleventh Circuit held in the decision below that Title IX "do[es] not embrace a private right of action for employees." Pet. App. 21a. In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit joined pre-Jackson decisions from the Fifth and Seventh Circuits in an 8-3 split.
The question presented is: Whether Title IX provides employees of federally funded educational institutions a private right of action to sue for sex discrimination in employment.
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-842 · from USCA-2
WASSILY V. BLANCHE, ATT’Y GEN.
Argument: Nov 30, 2026 · Granted Jun 29, 2026
Question presented
The asylum laws offer protection against removal for certain noncitizens in this country who suffered past persecution or reasonably fear future persecution in their country of nationality. For those “granted asylum,” the immigration laws also provide a pathway to obtain lawful permanent resident (LPR) status. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b), the government "may adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence the status of any alien granted asylum," if certain statutory criteria are satisfied. The question presented is:
Whether noncitizens who were "granted asylum," but whose asylum was later terminated, are eligible for adjustment to LPR status under Section 1159(b) (as the Fifth Circuit held), or are categorically ineligible (as the Second and Fourth Circuits held)?
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-246 · from SC-AK
JOUPPI V. ALASKA
Argument: Dec 1, 2026 · Granted Jul 20, 2026
Question presented
The "touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause" is that the amount of the fine "must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish." United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321,334 (1998). Below, the Alaska Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture of petitioner's $95,000 airplane because, the court reasoned, petitioner knew that one of his passenger's grocery bags contained a sixpack of Budweiser.
In so holding, the court captured vividly a lower-court conflict over the standard for evaluating the gravity of a property owner's offense under the Excessive Fines Clause. Aligning with the Eleventh Circuit, the Alaska Supreme Court examined the gravity of the defendant's offense at a stratospheric level of abstraction. Meanwhile, the federal circuit in which Alaska sits-in line with many other state and federal courts-holds that "[i]t is critical" to "review the specific actions of the violator rather than by taking an abstract view of the violation."
The question presented is whether, in determining whether a fine contravenes the Excessive Fines Clause, courts may consider the gravity of the underlying offense purely in the abstract or should consider the gravity of the specific defendant's wrongdoing.
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-238, 25-566 · from 1USCA-7; 2USCA-2
VIRAMONTES V. COOK COUNTY / GRANT V. HIGGINS
Argument: Dec 2, 2026 · Granted Jun 30, 2026
Question presented
Whether the Second and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to possess AR-15 platform and similar semiautomatic rifles.
PETITIONS GRANTED AS TO THE QUESTION PRESENTED BY THE PETITION IN NO. 25-238.
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-840 · from USCA-9
INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS FOR ETHICAL CARE, INC. V. FERGUSON
Argument: Dec 7, 2026 · Granted Jun 29, 2026
Question presented
The "interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children □ is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court." Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). But that right is mere rhetoric if federal judges bar parents from court via a miserly interpretation of standing doctrine-a question, as three Justices recently recognized, that is of "great and growing national importance." Lee v. Poudre Sch. Dist. R-1, 607 U.S. --, 2025 WL 2906469, *1 (2025) (Alita, J., statement) (citation omitted).
It is certainly important to Petitioners, who are parents of gender-confused children (including one child who previously ran away) and who do not wish to affirm that confusion. They challenged Washington laws designed to give runaway minors "gender affirming treatment" without parental notice or consent. But despite their being the challenged laws' target, and despite their alleging specific current harms and a substantial risk of specific future harms to their ability to parent, the Ninth Circuit held that Petitioners lacked Article III standing.
The question presented is:
Whether parents have standing to challenge a law or policy that deliberately displaces their decision-making role as to "gender transitions" of their children, and in so doing creates present and likely future impediments to their ability to parent their children as they deem best for them.
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-1017 · from USCA-9
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE V. MI FAMILIA VOTA
Argument: Dec 8, 2026 · Granted Jun 29, 2026
Question presented
Like every other State, Arizona permits only United States citizens to vote in federal elections. To enforce that qualification, Arizona requires every applicant who registers to vote to produce "satisfactory evidence of citizenship." Ariz. Rev. Stat. §16-121.01(C). If election officials obtain "information" from periodic inspections of Arizona's voter rolls that "confirms" a "person registered is not a United States citizen," they "cancel the registration." Id. §16-165(A) (10).
The Ninth Circuit held that the National Voter Registration Act-52 U.S.C. §§20506(a)(6) (A)(ii), 20508(b)(1), 20507(c)(2)(a)-preempts those provisions of Arizona law. It also held that Arizona cannot require voter-registration applicants to produce proof of citizenship because in 2018, a previous Arizona Secretary of State entered a consent decree with private litigants. This Court has granted an emergency stay on each issue: One in this case and one in a Fourth Circuit case. The RNC raises both questions here on the merits. The questions presented are:
(1) Does the National Voter Registration Act or a federal consent decree prohibit Arizona from requiring voter-registration applicants to produce "satisfactory evidence" of U.S. citizenship when registering with a state registration form?
(2) Does the National Voter Registration Act prohibit Arizona from implementing a program within 90 days of a federal election to cancel the registrations of voters who are not U.S. citizens?
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-965 · from USCA-6
GRAND V. CITY OF UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS
Argument: Dec 9, 2026 · Granted Jun 30, 2026
Question presented
Whether the First Amendment's established chilling-effect doctrine-under which a credible government threat that deters the exercise of fundamental rights constitutes a complete and independently actionable constitutional injury-is displaced by Williamson Cnty.'s land-use finality requirement when a plaintiff alleges that government threats both before and after a Planning Commission meeting chilled religious exercise, worship, and assembly.
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
26-426 · from USCA-1
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY V. D. V. D.
Argument: Dec 9, 2026 · Granted Sep 29, 2026
Question presented
Order of September 29, 2026 The parties are directed to brief and argue the following questions: (1) Whether the district court had jurisdiction over Respondents’ claims. (2) Whether the district court had authority to enter classwide declaratory relief and APA vacatur under 8 U. S. C. §1252(f)(1). (3) Whether the Government’s Guidance on third-country removals is unlawful under 8 U. S. C. §1231(b), the Due Process Clause, or FARRA/CAT and its implementing regulations. (4) Such other questions that the Government determines are appropriate for the proper disposition of the case.
EXPEDITED BRIEFING SCHEDULE
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-1223 · from USCA-4
MONTOYA PALACIOS V. LIGGINS
Argument: Jan 11, 2027 · Granted Jun 29, 2026
Question presented
The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) provides that, "in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort)" by or against the federal government, a court shall award to a prevailing party its fees and costs, unless the court finds certain exceptions present. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1)(A).
The question presented is whether, under EAJA, "any civil action" encompasses an action seeking a writ of habeas corpus to challenge civil immigration detention.
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-1311 · from USCA-9
APPLE INC. V. EPIC GAMES, INC.
Argument: Jan 11, 2027 · Granted Jun 30, 2026
Question presented
This case presents two fundamental and recurring questions concerning the limits on the equitable authority of the federal courts:
1. Whether a court may hold a party in civil contempt based on a violation of an injunction's "spirit" where the injunction is silent as to the conduct upon which contempt is based, as the Ninth Circuit holds; or, instead, whether a court must ground a finding of civil contempt on the violation of an order that clearly and unambiguously proscribes the precise conduct at issue, as other circuits hold.
2. Whether the Ninth Circuit has properly created an "antitrust" or "competition" exception to Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831 (2025), and the longstanding equitable principles on which CASA rests, or otherwise disregarded CASA's limits.
GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION.
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
24-1016 · from USCA-2
RISEANDSHINE CORP. V. PEPSICO, INC.
Argument: Jan 12, 2027 · Granted Jun 29, 2026
Question presented
Courts in every circuit consider several factors in determining whether an alleged trademark infringer's use "is likely to cause confusion" under 15 U.S.C. § 1114. Chief among those factors is the trademark's strength, that is, its level of distinctiveness. Twelve circuits consider trademark strength an issue of fact. The Second Circuit stands alone in considering it a question of law.
The question presented is:
Whether trademark strength is a question of fact in a likelihood-of-confusion analysis under 15 U.S.C. § 1114.
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-6623 · from Dist. Ct App. FL, 4th Dist.
KIAN V. FLORIDA
Argument: Jan 13, 2027 · Granted Jun 15, 2026
Question presented
Whether Petitioner was deprived of his right, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to a trial by a 12-person jury when the defendant is charged with a serious felony? There are two other petitions raising the same question presented. See Parada v. United States, No. 25-166; Minor v. Florida, No. 24-7489. This case should at least be held pending resolution of those petitions.
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-1349 · from SC-ND
MARSCHNER V. MARSCHNER
Argument: Jan 19, 2027 · Granted Oct 1, 2026
Question presented
In the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act ("USFSPA"), Congress provided that a State may treat veterans' longevity-based retirement pay as divisible property in divorce. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c). But Congress further provided that retirement pay that was waived to receive disability pay, as well as certain retirement pay received due to disability-related retirements, would be indivisible. 10 U.S.C. § 408(a)(4)(A)(ii), (iii).
In Howell v. Howell, 581 U.S. 214 (2017), a divorced veteran waived a portion of his longevity-based retirement pay in order to receive disability pay, causing his exwife's share of his retirement pay to decrease. The divorce court ordered him to indemnify his ex-wife for that reduction. This Court held that the USFSPA preempted that indemnification order. See id. at 222.
In this case, unlike in Howell, the parties agreed as part of their divorce settlement that the veteran would indemnify his ex-wife if her share of his retirement pay were reduced because he later waived his retirement pay to receive disability benefits or because he received disability-based retirement pay. Even though the veteran agreed to the indemnification provision at the time of the divorce, the North Dakota Supreme Court nonetheless held that, under Howell, enforcement of the indemnification provision was preempted.
The question presented is:
Does the USFSPA require state courts to refuse enforcement of indemnification provisions in divorce settlement agreements?
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-1131 · from SC-KY
MISSIONARIES OF ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST, INC. V. FREDERIC
Argument: Jan 20, 2027 · Granted Oct 1, 2026
Question presented
1. Whether a land-use regulation that prohibits a religious institution from building a religious structure on its own property constitutes a "substantial burden" on religious exercise under the Substantial Burden Provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). 2. Whether a land-use regulation violates the Equal Terms Provision of RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C.§ 2000cc(b)(1), by imposing express restrictions on religious assemblies or institutions that it does not impose on nonreligious assemblies or institutions.
GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION.
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-1103 · from USCA-DC
U.S. DOGE SERVICE V. UNITED STATES DIST. COURT FOR D. C.
Argument date not set yet · Granted Oct 13, 2026
Question presented
The district court in this case entered a wide-ranging and intrusive discovery order against the U.S. DOGE Service (USDS)-a body within the Executive Office of the President tasked with advising the President-to determine whether that body's influence renders it an "agency" subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552. This Court previously granted certiorari, vacated the court of appeals' denial of a writ of mandamus, and remanded for the court of appeals to "narrow" discovery in light of "separation of powers concerns." On remand, respondent withdrew several of its discovery requests, and the court of appeals again denied the government's mandamus petition without any new analysis regarding the remaining discovery, which includes numerous requests for internal communications and a deposition of USDS's head. The questions presented are:
1. Whether the court of appeals' order departed from this Court's instructions and the separation-of-powers principles that this Court articulated in Cheney v. United States District Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004).
2. Whether a court may order broad discovery against an Executive Office advisory body-potentially providing much information sought on the merits of a plaintiffs FOIA claims-to determine whether FOIA's disclosure requirements apply in the first place.
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-1343 · from USCA-4
BLANCHE, ATT’Y GEN. V. OZURUMBA
Argument date not set yet · Granted Oct 13, 2026
Question presented
An alien is removable and ineligible for various immigration benefits if he has provided material support to a terrorist organization. The question presented is whether, under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(Vl), such support must advance the organization's actual commission of terrorism to qualify for that bar.
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
25-1408 · from USCA-4
GOLDMAN SACHS BANK USA V. BROWN
Argument date not set yet · Granted Nov 6, 2026
25-7026 · from USCA-11
BERRY V. UNITED STATES
Argument date not set yet · Granted Oct 13, 2026
Question presented
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), an appeal may not be taken from a final order in a federal habeas proceeding unless a circuit judge or justice issues a "certificate of appealability" (COA). 28 U.S.C.§ 2253(c (1). A COA may issue only if the prisoner makes a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To do so, the prisoner must show that "reasonable jurists could debate" whether the petition should have been resolved in a different manner. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, A484 (2000).
The question presented is:
Whether a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 should be granted where the issue that the petitioner seeks to raise on appeal has been resolved against him by binding circuit precedent but has been resolved in his favor by another circuit.
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
26-12 · from USCA-4
ASSOCIATION FOR EDUCATION FAIRNESS V. MONTGOMERY
Argument date not set yet · Granted Oct 19, 2026
Question presented
Whether a plaintiff alleging that a school district implemented facially-neutral admissions criteria for a racially discriminatory purpose must show that the criteria produced a disparate impact on the targeted racial group before a court may consider evidence of discriminatory intent.
GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER A PLAINTIFF CHALLENGING A FACIALLY NEUTRAL ADMISSIONS POLICY AS RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY MUST ESTABLISH THAT THE TARGETED RACIAL GROUP SUFFERED AN AGGREGATE DISPARATE IMPACT RELATIVE TO ITS SHARE OF THE APPLICANT POOL.
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
26-104 · from USCA-2
RHONEY V. BARBOSA DA CUNHA
Argument date not set yet · Granted Oct 1, 2026
Question presented
Whether 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention pending removal proceedings of aliens who, like respondent, are present in the United States without having been admitted.
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
26-204 · from USCA-5
DEPT. OF JUSTICE V. MCNUTT
Argument date not set yet · Granted Oct 19, 2026
Question presented
Since the Founding era, Congress has imposed an excise tax on the production of distilled spirits. After documenting the extensive evasion of the government's efforts to collect the tax, Congress enacted a comprehensive scheme requiring distillation stills to be licensed and subject to inspection. One aspect of the scheme prohibited stills from being located in various places, including within residential properties-a restriction that has now been in effect for 160 years. In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit held that the location restrictions exceed Congress's enumerated powers, in direct conflict with a decision of the Sixth Circuit upholding the restriction on home distilling. The question presented is as follows:
Whether the prohibition on the production of distilled spirits in particular locations, including "in any dwelling house" or "in any shed, yard, or inclosure connected with any dwelling house," 26 U.S.C. 5178(a)(1)(B), is necessary and proper for carrying into execution Congress's enumerated power to lay and collect taxes.
Word for word from the Court's question-presented document. The document ↗
From the Court's Granted & Noted list (as of Nov 16, 2026). The list ↗
Decided this term · 2
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